World Views
The Magical Flower of Winter is an essay series exploring reality and our relationship to it. It deals with philosophy, science and our views of the world, with an eye on the metacrisis and our future. Sign up to receive new essays here:
I left off the previous piece having discussed an account of explanation and its limits in terms of providing understanding, as well as an explication of scientific realism and constructivism. These are co-existing narratives of what science is that both “fit the data” (nature is underdetermined), but they are radically different in their commitments and beliefs. A deeper understanding of this is what we aim for in the following discussion of incommensurability and world views. Aspects of the constructivist stance to science and the epistemic should remind us of the concept of epistemisation first brought up in Wittgenstein and the Private Language Argument, and the discussion about what world views are and how they relate to reality will naturally bring us back to a more in-depth treatment of this concept and the view of reality as a whole.
Incommensurability
Black suns herding the planets through a universe where the concept of space was meaningless for want of any end to it. For want of any concept to stand it against.
Cormac McCarthy - Stella Maris
Feyerabend (1981, first published 1962) and Kuhn (1996, first published 1962) quite individually arrived at the term incommensurability in the early 1960s to describe the possibility of having two or more theories that are incompatible with each other in a particular kind of way. Their conception of incommensurability differed slightly, and both of their understanding of the concept evolved throughout their lives, differences and evolutions I will briefly trace here. Incommensurability is a term from mathematics that means “to have no common measure”1, and applies to the relation between two theories, frameworks or languages, denotations I will interchangeably use together with world view in the following, a concept Feyerabend conceives of as “«…a collection of beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that involves the whole person, not only the intellect, has some kind of coherence and universality, and imposes itself with a power far greater than the power of facts and fact-related theories.»2
To Kuhn, incommensurability first came about as a characterization of radical conceptual differences from one world view to another. His reading of Aristotle's mechanics made Kuhn realize that the ancient use of for instance “motion” (Greek kinesis) entails a meaning that is incommensurable with our modern use of the term, which has been reshaped by two millennia of cultural and scientific history. To Aristotle, “motion” means not only physical and mechanical motion, but also all other progressions, like the “motion” of the acorn into the full-grown tree, something we would rather use the term “change” or “evolution” for. An important point is that with such an understanding of “motion”, the neighboring conceptual cluster must also be different in order to accommodate the difference: «Revolutionary changes are somehow holistic. They cannot, that is, be made piecemeal, one step at a time, and they thus contrast with normal or cumulative changes[…] An integrated picture of several aspects of nature has to be changed at the same time.»3 The ancient conception of “motion” and its conceptual cluster is simply not coherent or meaningful when read in terms of the modern understanding of the terms used. In his later writings Kuhn (2000, 2022) understood incommensurability to a larger extent to be about translation, not interpretation. To readers of Language and Meaning, this is linked to Quine’s indeterminacy of translation and the discussion about holism and relativism there. Different communities are entwined with different lexicons, paradigmatic divisions of the world, and incommensurability of two lexicons is seen as the impossibility of translating statements in one lexicon into the other, due to structural differences. “The concept of a scientific revolution originated in the discovery that to understand any part of the science of the past the historian must first learn the language in which that past was written. Attempts at translation into a later language are bound to fail, and the language-learning process is therefore interpretive and hermeneutic. Since success in interpretation is generally achieved in large chunks ("breaking into the hermeneutic circle"), the historian's discovery of the past repeatedly involves the sudden recognition of new patterns or gestalts. It follows that the historian, at least, does experience revolutions.”4 But importantly, we are able to transition between lexicons due to a kind of bilingualism, and we continuously do this, as different situations in life are all different contexts, each one of which is inseparable from varying conceptual frameworks. Without this bilingual ability, incommensurability would preclude inter-paradigmatic understanding. Incommensurability is usually an issue for the philosopher or the one taking a step back to take in several theories, but in order to take in several theories we need to bring them into contact, which creates a shared context through which bilingualism can be erected. The issues of the indeterminacy of translation and incommensurability both dissolve on understanding these phenomena holistically. As an example outside of science, one can attempt to read the translation of spiritual writings from the Eastern tradition written before or outside the influence of Western interpretation. A first reading will likely leave you with an impression of incomprehensibility, but continued study through e.g. encounters with the interpretations of other people will eventually create links from your knowledge to the unfamiliar conceptual cluster. The human experience as a whole provides the background against which understanding across paradigms is possible. For the practicing scientist his concerns are in most cases limited to one paradigm, one theory and world view, and incommensurability and translation issues only appear in interfaces with other world views, e.g. other research teams or disciplines.
This was recognised by Feyereband: «Incommensurability disappears when we use concepts as scientists use them, in an open, ambiguous and often counterintuitive manner. Incommensurability is a problem for philosophers not for scientists, though the latter may become psychologically confused by unusual things.» He continues, «In a word: observation statements are not just theory-laden (the views of Toulmin, Hanson and apparently also Kuhn) but fully theoretical and the distinction between observation statements... and theoretical statements is a pragmatic distinction, not a semantic distinction…»5 Feyerabends conception of incommensurability is focused on meaning variance. In passing through the paradigmatic revolution from Newton to Einstein, the meaning of the terms “space”, “time” and their co-dependent conceptual cluster varies, so that the post-relativistic understanding of what for instance a “distance” is, now shaped by Riemannian geometry etc., cannot be understood in terms of the Newtonian conceptual apparatus, bound to Euclidean geometry. Using the concepts developed by Kuhn, we can say that Feyerabend sees different lexicons as showcasing boundaries across which meaning is varying. We naively expect meaning to be something static and grounded, invariant, but as we have already seen, language and meaning is holistic and dynamic, and necessarily so in order for it to work6. This leads to paradigmatic problems: «It will turn out in the course of this essay that any form of meaning invariance is bound to lead to difficulties… It will also turn out that [incommensurable concepts] are exactly the difficulties we encounter in trying to solve such age-old problems as the mind-body problem, the problem of the reality of the external world, and the problem of other minds. That is, it will usually turn out that a solution of these problems is deemed satisfactory only if it leaves unchanged the meanings of certain key terms and that it is exactly this condition, the condition of meaning invariance, which makes them insoluble.»7 A world view is irreducibly contextual, inseparable from an experience immersed in spatiotemporal, cultural, psychological and epistemic history. In our motion from one context to another, the particulars of our experience, thus our world view changes in a covariant way along with meanings and the conceptual web. Our most common error is not realizing this dynamic.
What does this conception of science, lexicons and meaning say about reality? “Underlying all these processes of differentiation and change, there must, of course, be something permanent, fixed, and stable. But, like Kant's Ding an sich [“Thing-in-itself”], it is ineffable, undescribable, undiscussible. Located outside of space and time, this Kantian source of stability is the whole from which have been fabricated both creatures and their niches, both the "internal" and the "external" worlds. Experience and description are possible only with the described and describer separated, and the lexical structure which marks that separation can do so in different ways, each resulting in a different, though never wholly different, form of life. Some ways are better suited to some purposes, some to others. But none is to be accepted as true or rejected as false; none gives privileged access to a real, as against an invented, world.”8 What we must aim for is, ultimately, a conception of reality capable of supporting both incommensurable and complementary world views. «[Reality in itself] is prior both to worlds and to the communities which inhabit them. Speech requires not only something to talk about but also someone to talk and someone to listen. With all three in place, there is already a world and already a speech community. Both are historically situated, in interaction through the lexicon which is constitutive of both. About what came before, there is nothing that can be said. Not even the question, "Which came first, the world or its group?" is admissible.»9 We see here how the only notion of the real in itself that is justifiable, how the only way reality can coherently be understood is as being ineffable and inaccessible, as something behind everything which is independent of our lexicons, our world views, because it is prior to them. Is this a fallacy? Have we not returned back to a dualism? These questions provide a segue back to epistemisation.
Epistemisation
When you say: How shall I put this? What is the this that you are trying to put?
…my view was that you can’t fetch something out of the absolute without fetching it out of the absolute. Without converting it into the phenomenological…
Cormac McCarthy - Stella Maris
In Wittgenstein and the Private Language Argument I defined epistemisation: “The pre-linguistic can play no role to the linguistic, to meaning, because the thing named, the essence, the meaning object, the thing-in-itself, disappears from the equation that our world is made out of. I term this epistemisation: any epistemic process (linguistic, conceptual, mathematical, empirical) epistemises the ontic. The instant we move away from just experiencing, to structuring experience, talking about it, measuring it, the ontic has already evaporated. From the point of view of the epistemic everything is always-already epistemised. The ontic is, epistemically, an unreachable limit.” The only statement we can make about reality in itself, is that it is, prior to any epistemisation, but primordially dependent on an experiencing subject to be for. This mutual co-dependence and co-existence between experience and reality is primary. «Ultimate Reality, if such an entity can be postulated, is ineffable. What we do know are the various forms of manifest reality, i.e., the complex ways in which Ultimate Reality acts in the domain (the "ontological niche") of human life. Many scientists identify the particular manifest reality they have developed with Ultimate Reality. This is simply a mistake.»10 We cannot talk about Ultimate Reality, the ontic, only about its co-dependent manifestation and co-existence as experience.
Even Kant’s thing-in-itself projects “thing”-hood onto the ontic, which we cannot on this holistic view do. At the same time, crucially, neither can we say that due to the lack of “thing”-hood, the ontic is structureless or boundaryless! The ontic projection fallacy is the name I give to any and all attempts at further explicating reality in itself, accounts that are not fundamentally built around the co-dependence and co-creativity of reality and experience and accounts that attempt to go beyond the statement that reality is. Wittgenstein’s closing remark in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus famously encapsulates this: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” Ascribing continuity, unity, seamlesness or similar aspects can only be done to experience, which is irreducibly a co-dependent and co-existing relation to the ontic, and not the ontic-in-itself. The particularist mindset of things separated from the whole makes it hard for us to stop conceptualizing in terms of things-in-themself, rather than see that it is the relation, the flow that is primary. At the same time, neither can we say that this flow is “Mind”, this is equally a fallacy: us as experiencers, co-dependent and co-existing parts of the flow, are minds, but this does not justify us in saying that the flow is Mind. The river is not only water, though water is part of it.
Examples of taking the wrong turn here abound in the literature, particularly in the disciplines of ontology and philosophy of mind. In Every Thing Must Go (2007), Ladyman and Ross consider structural realism in two variants: epistemic and ontic. Epistemic structural realism is the view that science only tells us of the independent structure of the world, and not its nature. We can only know the structural, not the underlying reality, which is unobservable and inaccessible to us. Ontic structural realism is the view that the world's independent nature is structure, and mind-independent modal relations between phenomena are ontologically fundamental11. Ladyman and Ross favor the ontic variety of structural realism, and thus incur the ontic projection fallacy, in addition to their commitment to nature as independent of us. The former, epistemic structural realism, similarly falls on its realist independence claim of the underlying reality. Epistemic structuralism, without its realist commitment, is however a holistically coherent stance and one I support: relations are prior to the relata (the “things” that the relations are amongst). Azzouni is on the right track in his Ontology Without Borders (2017), where he provides an account of object projectivism, the view that psychological, linguistic and evolutionary mechanisms have cued us to projecting objects onto the world, while neither ontological boundaries or stuffs are metaphysically real. Azzouni posits reality as a boundaryless flow of “features” which he attempt to explicate further, but in not doing this in an experience-dependent way I fear he falls to the ontic projection fallacy: features are epistemic and cannot be projected onto the ontic. Similarly, Horgan and Potrč in their Austere Realism (2008) provide an account of ontological vagueness and semantic contextualism leading to a realism where ontologically there can be no boundaries, and where any truth in our experience is contextual and only indirectly corresponding to ultimate reality. But their view is still a realism, committed to a “blobject” (their term) which is claimed to have “enormous spatiotemporal structural complexity, and enormous local variability” (p. 3), thus falling prey to the fallacy: Spatiotemporal structure is epistemic, not ontic. None of these approaches integrate the irreducibly participatory and contextual co-dependence of reality and experience.
Austere realism constitutes a variant of existence monism (monism - a oneness, as opposed to dualism), that only one “object” exists, “the One”12. This is again claiming a property, unity, of the ontic, which however strongly we may feel to be true, is an aspect of experience and not reality-in-itself. Related to the existence monist view there is priority monism13, that only one concrete object exists (the universe), of which other objects are derivative. This view acknowledges the priority of the whole (I will return to priority monism in an upcoming essay). Russellian monism is the view that the ineffable properties (“quiddities”) that underlie the spatiotemporal structure physics describes is the same as what underlies our experience14. As long as we now don’t attempt to say anything more about this co-dependent reality-experience, we are on the right track, but a multitude of views do exactly this and commit the ontic projection fallacy. Variants of panpsychism claim the ontic is mental at the microlevel, thus that consciousness suffuses everything. Not only is this ontic projection, but it provides a prime example of projecting a concept past any recognizable context in which this term acquires its meaning. Statements of panpsychism are to a large extent enmeshed in the particularist framework, which lead to such absurdities as “electrons have/are conscious”, while all we can say is that “electrons are in/of consciousness”, in/of our model of reality, beyond which it is meaningless to project epistemics. Panprotopsychism is a further development where it is posited that ultimate reality consists of elements or properties that are proto-conscious, i.e. not themselves conscious but that collectively manifest consciousness. This view as such posits a structure we cannot claim is there. Cosmopsychisms15 believe that the cosmos as a whole is conscious, a view that while solving some issues of panpsychism and panprotopsychism (i.e. their dependence on microstructure being conscious or proto-conscious), still suffers from ontic projection through now projecting consciousness to the cosmos as a whole. Regardless of this view being holistic, i.e. properly prioritizing the whole, it projects beyond proper context. For the same reason contemporary idealisms in the philosophy of mind16 fall short of providing a coherent view of reality as a whole. This account of the work of others is severely rough and brief, and though I disagree with the pieces I have highlighted above, there is obviously much insightful value to all of these positions. I leave a more in-depth analysis to the future, but it should be clear that the underlying issues in the above positions I am opposing is their overlap with the particularist framework. The particularist trap is to conceive of ultimate reality in-itself, a “One”, which we claim things about (reductively, materialistically, constitutively) and map our model onto. Reality is, and our experience a part of this “flow”, co-creative, co-dependent, co-existing, yet this flow cannot be modelled, for any model is inevitably limited.
To comment on the constructivist account of science laid out in the previous essay, we must see this account not as claiming that we exclusively make or control reality, this is idealist hubris. The construction is reciprocal, as I stated in the very first essay: the observer shapes the observed, but so too does the observed shape the observer. The flow of the experience of reality is not of our making, but our model of it, science, which is part of our world view, is. There seems to be so many reasons for taking the realist turn and making the leap to the ontic, but when we look closer at each one, the ontic is nowhere to be found. Sure, on the surface we find that for instance temperature is a sensation-dependent and theory-dependent concept, but «below» this, the realist says, there is a microphysical world from which this concept emerges, to which this concept corresponds. We now look deeper but find only more concepts, posited structures to which our instruments react, but only in the right context, only under the interpretation of a theory. We simply cannot rid ourselves of this primary notion of dependence. We might now argue that all this comes down to confusing the epistemic for the ontic. It is our framework that is limited, it can’t “be” the ontic like we expect it to, because ultimate reality, the ontic, is irreducible to language. The ontic is still there, we want to say, it is still “the world in itself”. But the whole point is that any further statement about the ontic than this cannot be made, because we have no way of justifying it! There is no language outside language, no reality outside the context, the experience, in which this sign, “reality”, gets its meaning. Our model of reality becomes transparent to our eye, and we mistake it for a reality-in-itself. We cannot speak about the ontic as such, only of epistemisation, because to speak of the ontic is to make a leap we cannot by any means justify. The ontic can only be experienced, not known.
In order to provide some visual illustration, an image of the relationship between the epistemic (science, language, representation) and the ontic (reality-in-itself), is that the epistemic stands to reality as the builders' scaffolding stands to the cathedral. They are co-dependent as constructions, and co-dependent for their existence: neither exists without the other, and neither is the other. The ontic is the unreachable limit of the epistemic, but also what is inscribed by our epistemic investigation from the edge. Our epistemic investigation (“science”, “language”, “metaphysics”) thus gives the ontic life. The ontic is an optical illusion as seen from the epistemic, a shadow cast by us, and recognizing it as the boundary of the epistemic is necessarily a continuous activity of this approach to reality, because as we experience and the epistemic changes, so too does the boundary. Of course, this illustration is inevitably a limited model, it too is a representation. The image of a cathedral’s scaffolding breaks down, because the ontic forever escapes our grasp, perpetually receding our every attempt at capturing it, and as I hope should now be clear, this is epistemisation.
World Views
Our world view is not simply the way we look at the world… world views create worlds.
Richard Tarnas - Cosmos and Psyche
The epistemic is a construction subject to co-dependence, coherence and covariance with experience. Experience is irreducible to the epistemic, and the ontic can only be experienced, not known. The epistemic and epistemisation holds a largely transparent role in life, perhaps glimpsed or intimated by many, but rarely is any attempt made to speak about it. Our blindness to the relationship between experience and reality is due to the efficacy and dominance of particularism, whose false or misconceived ontic, an external and independent reality, arises as the placeholder of background, the stage against which our epistemics act. The nature of the epistemic is hidden from us: it is its own covariant background. No knowledge, no fact, can transcend its limitation as epistemic. This is why a view of reality as a whole must recognize this, a view that is self-grounded. We mistake the power and reach of the epistemic, the ignorance of which, together with the ontic projection fallacy, gives rise to the hard problems and consequent irresolvable debates. Our particularist hunger for reductive explanation blinds us to holistic understanding and wisdom. By speaking about the heretofore unspoken, by putting into words something that is “larger” than words, we inevitably limit the unspoken, constrict it. And the valence of the outcome of this delimiting is often completely unknown in the act, its effect on people and events, the path forward, undeniably actual but utterly unpredictable and irreducible, which fact again motivates a holistic approach. Importantly, this view of reality as a whole is also a model, all views are, and as such all that one can say is metaphor. I strongly believe that this view of reality provides a metaphor that is far more in line with our experience, and a world view far better suited at grounding the necessary reality shift that is required if we are to reach a future in harmony. This is not to abandon the reductive, to abandon traditional science, but to acknowledge its limitations and domain as a part of a whole that is primarily irreducible.
In Panoptic Interlude I provided a sketch of the holistic view of reality as a whole as a meta-structure in which other views can be evaluated, and in which itself can be evaluated. This possibility of looping due to self-reference is necessary for a view that is upholding itself, without any external grounding. As an epistemological dimension it is a statement that the epistemic is a plurality of views, theories or frameworks, and that not only is this what we observe science to be, but that this is an inescapable observation of humanity as consisting of individuals, each with their own contextual and subjective view. Historically, humans have to a large extent had a world view shaped by one religion or another, in addition to explanatory narratives and beliefs perpendicular to the modern Western culture. Science as a dominant force in shaping world view is a comparably recent trend. The religious world view, to the extent one can generalize, is equally a construction, and is equally contextual about what there is, and about truth and morals. That billions of people even today have a world view that to a large extent is shaped by religion should amply convince us of the plurality of world views, and how one’s world view shapes experience, and co-creatively through us, reality. But any world view that is incapable of tolerating and accepting the existence of other world views will be limited: in their closedness these cannot provide a meaningful account of reality as a whole.
What about the claim that we talk and act as if particularism is true, as if there is a reality independent of us? If we subscribe to pragmatism, to meaning by use, should we not take our «using terms as if particularism holds» and similar statements to pragmatically mean that realism is “correct”? Talking as if something is true is no justification of its correctness, and that we act according to a world view is no argument in favor of it when these same actions lead to self-destruction. There are alternative views to particularism, the very existence of which is in conflict with particularism as a meta-structure: as we saw in Philosophy for our Future it cannot support alternatives because these are not in correspondence to the “true external and independent world”. But this plurality, the existence of alternative views of reality, is in line with a holistic meta-structure. The holistic stance provides precisely the starting point for a meta-structure and view of reality as a whole I have argued is needed to start to correct our self-terminating activities, because it provides an account of experience and reality based on coherence and co-dependence. The only meaningful way to talk about transcendence on this view is not as a statement about the ontic, but as a statement about one’s epistemic world view, only by breaking free from the bondage of particularism can one transcend to a larger view of reality as a whole, an attempted likeness of which is represented in the first image of this essay.
The fabric out of which our world is made is no thing, no division, but the co-dependent relation of subject and object, the epistemic and the ontic, I and Thou, the self and the other, experience and reality. As such, the fabric of the tapestry is truly no substance, no material, but this flow, this irreducible process, this whole prior to all substance. Just like we find the ontic to be the unreachable and inaccessible limit of the epistemic, following McGilchrist (2021) we find the inanimate as the limit of the animate, the thing-in-itself as the limit of the whole, relata as the limit of relation, stasis as the limit of motion, and the list goes on. These seeming dichotomies are no statement of “either/or”, but to “both/and”, but the priority of them is clear. A reader (Thank you!) recently recommended that I check out McGilchrist and his The Matter with Things, and after just having read the introduction I was astonished at the similarities in substance, approach and overall aim to my own thinking and writing. McGilchrist writes “And the whole is shot through with purpose [...], and endlessly creative, not pointless and passive. This cosmos is one from which we are never separate, but out of which we arise, in which we dwell, and to which, finally, we return.”17 He continues “We are dealing here with a phenomenon or process whose shape can be intuited, but to which our everyday language is not well adapted... the world is a seamless, always self-creating, self-individuating, and simultaneously self-uniting, flow that is only truly knowable as it comes to be known.”18 It is comforting to find an internal validation for one’s view and aim in other’s work, though I am sure my view will differ from McGilchrist’s in many ways. From this asymmetry, something new can come into being.
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References
Albahari, M. (2019). Perennial Idealism: A Mystical Solution to the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophers’ Imprint, 19(44).
Alter, T. A. (Ed.). (2015). Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. Oxford University Press.
Azzouni, J. (2017). Ontology Without Borders. Oxford University Press.
Feyerabend, P. K. (1981). Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism in Philosophical Papers Vol. 1: Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method. Cambridge University Press.
Feyerabend, P. (1993). Against Method. Verso. [1975]
Feyerabend, P. K. (2001). Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction Versus the Richness of Being (Ed. B. Terpstra). University of Chicago Press.
Horgan, T., & Potrč, M. (2008). Austere realism : contextual semantics meets minimal ontology. MIT Press.
Kastrup, B. (2019). The Idea of the World: A Multi-disciplinary Argument for the Mental Nature of Reality. Iff Books.
Kuhn, T. S. (1996). The structure of scientific revolutions. University of Chicago Press. [1962]
Kuhn, T. S. (2000). The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview. University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (2022). The Last Writings of Thomas S. Kuhn: Incommensurability in Science (Ed. Bojana Mladenovic). University of Chicago Press.
Ladyman, J., Ross, D., & Spurrett, D. (2007). Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Clarendon Press.
McCarthy, C. (2022). Stella Maris. Pan Macmillan.
McGilchrist, I. (2021). The Matter with Things. Perspectiva.
Nagasawa, Y., & Wager, K. (2017). Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism. In L. Jaskolla & G. Brüntrup (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
Oberheim, E., & Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2018) The Incommensurability of Scientific Theories in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Edward N. Zalta), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/incommensurability/.
Päs, H. (2023). The One: How an Ancient Idea Holds the Future of Physics. Basic Books.
Schaffer, J. (2010). Monism: The Priority of the Whole. Philosophical Review, 119(1), 31-76.
Shani, I. (2015). Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience. Philosophical Papers, 44(3), 389-437.
Sider, T. (2011). Writing the Book of the World. OUP Oxford.
Tarnas, R. (2006). Cosmos and Psyche: Intimations of a New World View. Viking.
Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Tractatus Logico-philosophicus (D. F. Pears & B. McGuinness, Trans.). Routledge. [1921]
Oberheim (2018).
Feyerabend (2001) p. 164.
Kuhn (2000) p. 28-29.
Kuhn (2000) p. 56.
Feyerabend (1993) p. 211.
Feyerabend (1981) p. 46-47.
Kuhn (2000) p. 104.
Kuhn (2022) p. 82-83.
Feyerabend (2001) p. 214.
Similarly, Sider (2011) develops a structural realism.
See also the recent Päs (2023), which as a monism fails for physicalist-reductionist reasons.
See Schaffer (2010).
See e.g. Alter (2015).
See e.g. Nagasawa and Wager (2017), Shani (2015).
E.g. the perennial idealism of Albahari (2019) and the analytic idealism of Kastrup (2019).
McGilchrist (2021) p. 9.
McGilchrist (2021) p. 15-16.